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SECURITIES REGULATION - Fraud - Reckless Conduct Satisfies
Scienter Requirement when Fiduciary Duty is Owed to Investor.
Rolf v. Byth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
In Roif v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co. the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit 2 announced that if a broker owes a fiduciary
duty to an investor, reckless conduct by the broker is the legal
equivalent of scienter. The decision eliminates, at least in the Second
Circuit, one of the important questions left undecided by the
landmark case Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,3 that is, whether reckless
behavior meets the requirement of scienter4 in a civil action under
rule lOb-5.5 The court held a registered representative and his
brokerage firm liable for aiding and abetting a fraud perpetrated on
an investor by an investment advisor and awarded the investor an
amount equal to that portion of his trading losses occasioned by
defendant's actions.
Dr. Rolf placed a discretionary6 account7 with Blyth, Eastman,
1. 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (per Oakes, J.) cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3383 (Dec. 5,
1978).
2. Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). The rules
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) were promulgated under authority granted in §§ 6 and 19 of the Act; 15 U.S.C. §§
78f, s(b)(l) (1970). And although these rules are not "rules thereunder," they are sufficient to
give federal jurisdiction. Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135, 142 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 838 (1969). See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities
Based upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12, 18-19 (1966). But see Lange v. H.
Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976), in which the court, in a startling opinion,
held that it had no jurisdiction to consider a complaint based on a violation of NASD rules.
3. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
4. The conflict among the circuits whether scienter is required for a violation of rule
lOb-5 was settled when the Supreme Court declared that a private cause of action based on
lOb-5 will not lie without an allegation of scienter, Ze. an intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud. Id at 193. The Court explicitly refused to extend the scope of the rule to negligent
conduct. Id at 214. The principle that mere negligence will not support a cause of action has
since been reaffirmed by the Court. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74
(1977).
5. The rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 CF.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
6. A discretionary account gives the broker or investment advisor the power to buy and
Dillon & Co.' (BEDCO). Responsibility for the account was eventu-
ally given to defendant Michael Stott who knew nothing about Rolf
or his financial situation and who made no attempt to investigate
them. On Stott's suggestion' Rolf hired Akiyoshi Yamada as an in-
vestment advisor and gave him full discretionary authority over the
account. Stott offered a few recommendations to Yamada, but his
major role during this period was to reassure Rolf about the invest-
ments Yamada was making for him. Yamada fraudulently manipu-
lated the account, which declined over one million dollars.9
Although BEDCO did not supervise the account, because Yamada
had complete trading authority, it received over fifty-five thousand
dollars in commissions and interest on RoWs margin account.
Before Stott could be held liable for aiding and abetting'
Yamada's fraud, plaintiff had to meet a three-part test. The court
easily found that Yamada met the first requirement of an independ-
ent securities law violation." The court also held that Stott rendered
sell securities for the account. In a nondiscretionary account the investor selects his own secur-
ities and the broker merely executes the orders.
7. Rolf placed the account with Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., Inc. (BEDCO) in 1963.
When Stott assumed responsibility for it in 1969, it was worth over $1,000,000. Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman, Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1025-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
8. Rolf believed Stott lacked the expertise to direct his account, but he agreed to keep
the account at BEDCO if Stott would recommend an investment advisor. Stott, although he
knew nothing about the account or Rolf, suggested two men, and Rolf interviewed and se-
lected Yamada. Id at 1027.
9. The district court referred to Yamada's handling of Roll's account as a "gross fraud."
Id at 1043.
10. 570 F.2d at 47-49. "Aiding and abetting" has been defined in securities cases by
reference to both criminal and tort law. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). The common-law definition, which is similar to the one used
by the circuit court in Rof is as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is
liable if he. . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. Re-
statement Torts § 876 (1939).
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The Supreme Court, in setting the standard for aiding and abetting the commission of a
crime, said, "it is necessary that a defendant 'in some sort associate himself with the venture,
that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action
to make it succeed."' Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) quoting United
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1940). But in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 191 n.7 (1976), the Court noted that it had not yet determined the requisites of the offense
in the securities context. For general background for the problem, see Ruder, Mult.le Defend-
ants in Securities Law Fraud CasesAiding andAbetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicdo, Indemnof-
cation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620-45 (1972).
Ii. The district court found that Yamada committed two wrongs. First, he consciously
defrauded Rolf by inducing him to purchase secretly-manipulated securities. Second, he
breached his fiduciary duty owed to Rolf as his investment advisor. 424 F. Supp. at 1043.
In his dissenting opinion Judge Mansfield attempted to analyze the individual securities
in Rolfs portfolio to show that many could not be considered unsuitable for him. 570 F.2d at
55 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). While it is true that some of the stocks selected by Yamada were
profitable for Rolf, it is undeniable that Yamada used Rolf s money to further his extensive
fraudulent scheme. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. at 1033-35.
substantial assistance to Yamada, the third requirement. 12 The
significance of the decision lies in the court's determination that Stott
had knowledge of Yamada's fraud, the second requirement.
The court held that conduct necessary to meet the scienter re-
quirement in a private action under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934'3 will also serve to prove knowledge on the
part of the alleged aider and abettor.14 If a broker owes a fiduciary
duty to an investor, recklessness is a sufficient standard of conduct.
15
Reckless conduct is generally defined as
[a] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple or
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of mis-
leading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or
so obvious that [he] must have been aware of it. 6
This definition fails to add anything to this area of the law because
"inexcusable negligence" and reckless conduct are practically indis-
tinguishable. Furthermore, if the actor "must have been aware" of
the fraud, a reason must exist why he was not actually aware of it. If
this reason is that a broker breached a duty of inquiry imposed by a
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)' 7 or National Association of Se-
12. Stott processed the relevant orders and, through his continual reassurance to Rolf,
prevented discovery of Yamada's fraud. 570 F.2d at 48.
In a footnote added to the opinion five months after it was initially released, the court
indicated,
This decision does not impose liability on a broker-dealer who merely executes or-
ders for "unsuitable" securities made by an investment advisor vested with sole dis-
cretionary authority to control the account. In the present case, the broker-dealer,
although charged with supervisory authority over the advisor and aware that the ad-
visor was purchasing "junk," actively lulled the investor by expressing confidence in
the advisor without bothering to investigate whether these assurances were well-
founded.
Id as mod&6ed by [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (C.C.H.) 1 96525 (1978). See generally
Note, The Private Action Againxt a Securities FraudAider andAbettor." Silent and Inactive Con-
duct, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1233 (1976).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
14. 570 F.2d at 48.
15. Id cf. S.E.C. v. Coven, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (C.C.H.) 1 96462 (1978),
in which the Second Circuit extended its decision in Rolfand held that scienter is not required
for aiding and abetting liability in an action under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15
U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1970).
[The] test is whether an alleged aider and abettor "should have been able to conclude
that his act was likely to be used in furtherance of illegal activity," in light of all the
circumstances, including the nature of defendant's assistance to the primary wrong-
doer, his participation in the challenged conduct, his awareness of the illegal scheme,
and any duties to investigate or supervise that may be applicable.
[Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (C.C.H.) at 93,679.
16. Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1134 n.15 (M.D. Fla. 1978) quoting Franke v.
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (w.D. Okla. 1976). See also Coleco
Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1976); S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 1226, 1243 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1978). If the defendant
genuinely forgot to make the disclosure or it never came to mind he would not be liable.
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.20 (7th Cir. 1977).
17. See [1962] 2 NYSE GUIDE (C.C.H.) 1 2405.
Rule 405 - Every member organization is required through a general partner or an
curities Dealers (NASD)' 8 rule, then he should be held accountable
for this dereliction, which is the rationale the district court utilized
for imposing liability against Stott for violation of these rules as well
as for aiding and abetting. 9 The court of appeals, however, refused
to face what it called the "thorny" question whether a private cause
of action exists for a breach of these private rules and found liability
only for aiding and abetting.2'
NYSE rule 40521 requires each member of the exchange to exer-
cise due diligence to learn the essential facts about each customer
and each person holding a power of attorney over a customer's ac-
count. The NASD Rules of Fair Practice22 impose a duty to deter-
mine the suitability of a security for an investor after considering his
financial situation and needs.23 The lower court accepted Roll's con-
tention that if Stott had adhered to these requirements and warned
Rolf of the nature of the securities, he would have never invested in
them.2
Because the NYSE and NASD are private organizations,25 it is
questionable whether a private investor may sue for damages caused
by a violation of these rules.26 Although the court in the leading
decision Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co." denied a right of
action for one rule because it was too vague, it laid down a test that
can be used to answer the question.
The court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its
officer who is a holder of voting stock to (1) use due diligence to learn the essential
facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted
or carried by such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any
account accepted or carried by such organization, (2) supervise diligently all accounts
handled by registered representatives of the organization.
Id.
18. See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 2, NASD MANUAL (REPRINT) 2152
(1969).
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suit-
able for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any disclosed by such customer
as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
Id Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1977) (SEC rule concerning suitability for nonmember bro-
kers).
19. 424 F. Supp. at 1040-43.
20. 570 F.2d at 48 n.19.
21. See note 17 supra
22. See note 18 supra
23. "Information concerning financial situation and needs would ordinarily include in-
formation concerning the customer's marital status, the number and age of his dependents, his
earnings, the amount of his savings and life insurance, and his security holdings and other
assets." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-8125, [1966-67 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (C.C.H.) 77459.
24. 424 F. Supp. at 1040-43.
25. The NYSE and NASD are self-regulatory organizations authorized by 15 U.S.C. §§
78f, 78o(3), 78s (1970).
26. Compare Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969) and Starkman v.
Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) with O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964)
and Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
27. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implica-
tion of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden
of persuasion than when the violation is of the statute or an SEC
regulation. The case for implication would be strongest when the
rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law.
28
The lower court in Rolf reasoned that a private right of action
should be permitted29 because the SEC has enacted comparable reg-
ulations,30 the rules are designed to protect the investor,3' and the
duties may be unknown at common law.32
It is often said that hard cases make bad law, but here the appel-
late court ignored the "hard case" and still managed to make bad
law. The same result could have been reached in a way that would
preserve aiding and abetting liability for a person with knowledge of
the fraud and still provide defrauded investors with a cause of action
against a broker who breached his fiduciary duty.33 Instead the court
permitted a cause of action against a broker who had no knowledge
of the fraud and who had no effective method of acquiring such
knowledge except from the primary wrongdoer. In dissent Judge
Mansfield criticized this approach taken by the majority and referred
to the decision as "virtually indistinguishable from that reversed in
Hochfelder. ,34
28. Id at 182.
29. 424 F. Supp. at 1041. Cf. Parsons v. Horblower Weks - Hemphill Noyes, [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (C.C.H.) 1 95,885 (existence of right of action under NYSE
rule 405 does not imply a corresponding right under NASD rule).
30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15b10-3, 240.15b10-4 (1977). See Plunkett v. Dominick & Domi-
nick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn. 1976) (promulgation of rules by the SEC is some
evidence that duties imposed thereby are an integral part of SEC regulation). But see Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Ia. 1975).
31. Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975).
Under such rules, the investing public is, in a very real sense, a third party
beneficiary of the duties imposed upon those required to adhere to those rules....
The rules which are the subject of discussion here are not broad generalized "catch-
alls" as in Colonial Realty v. Bache A Co., 358 F.2d 178, above; rather they are rules
which are quite precise in comparison and have among their purposes the protection
of the investing public .... Both rules play integral parts in the protection of the
investing public and are explicit in the duties they create. The protection of the in-
vesting public is enhanced, not diminished, by permitting a private action to be based
on these rules; and such actions, where based on such explicit rules, further the pur-
poses of these Acts. They do not merely vaguely adjure the broker to behave himself.
Id at 683. See Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974); Avern Trust
v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969); Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Other courts have held that the purpose of the rules is not to protect the investor but to
protect the securities dealer. E.g. Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Minn. 1977); cf.
Musser v. Bache & Co. 11977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (C.C.H.) J96,183 (NASD
Rules are based on cooperative self-regulation that would be undermined by private suits).
32. Carroll v. Doolittle, 21 Misc. 2d 203, 191 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1959). see also Mundheim,
Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers." The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445,
452 (suitability rule analogous to warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (U.C.C. § 2-315)).
33. See also Comment, Establir/unent of Liability for Aiding and Abetting Fraud under
Rue 166-5 and the Common Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 862 (1978).
34. 570 F.2d at 52 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100
(7th Cir. 1974), rev'd 425 U.S. 185 (1976), involved an accounting firm retained by a broker-
Actual knowledge of the fraud should be required before a
party is liable for aiding and abetting a securities law violation.35
Equitable principles demand that a person have knowledge that his
actions are assisting a crime before he can be held accountable for it;
nevertheless, a party should not be able to sit idly and ignore evi-
dence of fraud if he stands in a fiduciary position. Ignorance of a
fiduciary duty, however, is an independent wrong that can be reme-
died without recourse to the medium of an aiding and abetting ac-
tion36-- most easily by the recognition of a private right of action for
breach of the NYSE or NASD rules.
In a sense this argument is merely semantic since in Rolf the
result would have been the same under either theory of liability. But
circumstances may arise in which the results differ. For example, if
the securities had been manipulated by someone other than
Yamada, but he, in good faith, made the same trades for Rolf, then
Stott could not be liable to Rolf since there would have been no
primary securities law violation attributable to Yamada; Stott could
have prevented the loss, however, by fulfilling his duty and inquiring
into the suitability of the securities for Roll. It is inconsistent and
inequitable to permit conduct leading to identical results to support
liability in one instance and to go blameless in another. The court
should have ignored the aiding and abetting liability and squarely
faced the question of liability for breach of a fiduciary duty.
The court of appeals did redeem itself on the question of dam-
ages." Rolf claimed he was entitled to recover his net trading losses
and punitive damages.38 Although the district court awarded only
the commissions paid to BEDCO plus interest on the margin ac-
age firm whose president defrauded the firm's clients. Ernst & Ernst was charged with failing
to properly audit the brokerage firm and thus aiding and abetting the fraud. The plaintiff and
defendant had no direct contact with each other.
llochfelder is factually distinguishable from Roif in which the broker and the investor
regularly communicated with each other, and the broker continually gave personal assurances
as to the investments being made. Furthermore, policy reasons in favor of not holding the
accountants liable cannot extend to a broker in constant contact with his client. See Ul-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
35. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. E.L. Aaron & Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(C.C.H.) 1 96,043 (supervisor's knowledge of false statements by brokers sufficient for aiding
and abetting liability). See generally Ruder, supra note 10 (knowledge required but scienter is
incorrect concept).
36. Hanly v. S.E.C., 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon &
Co., 424 F. Supp. at 1036.
37. On the general issue of damages in securities cases see Mullaney, Theories of Meamr-
aig Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FoRD. L. REv.277
(1977) and Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093 (1977).
38. Punitive damages are not awarded in this type of case for two reasons. First, the suit
itself provides sufficient deterrent value. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein. Second, the Securities Exchange Act itself limits
recovery to "actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). Some courts have construed this to
prohibit punitive damages. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969).
count, the appellate court reversed and awarded Rolf his net trading
losses adjusted to reflect the overall decline in the market.39 Unfortu-
nately the court overcompensated Rolf by utilizing the following
formula to determine the amount of damages: ascertain the time pe-
riod when Stott had an effect on RoWs account; subtract the final
value of Roll's portfolio from its initial value; then reduce the result
by the stock market decline during this period.' A proper formula
would reduce the initial value by the percentage decline in the mar-
ket (thus giving the supposed value of the portfolio had Rolf done no
trading) and then subtract the final value and award plaintiff the re-
mainder. Notwithstanding this flaw, the court was correct in its
award because the decline in the account as well as the loss of com-
missions can be directly attributed to Stott.
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.4 ' is significant, not so much
for its holding, but for the implicit warning it gives to the securities
industry. Since conscious intent to deceive the investor is no longer a
prerequisite to recovery, stricter control over discretionary accounts
must be maintained or the firm42 and its employees will find them-
selves liable to investors whose losses could have been avoided.
4 3
Correspondingly, an attorney who represents an investor may incor-
porate the reasoning in this opinion into an argument to impose lia-
bility on persons having little direct connection with the investor's
losses. It remains to be seen how far the concept of recklessness will
be extended toward negligence," and thus, this area presents a fertile
ground for future litigation.
39. 570 F.2d at 49.
40. Consider the following example: assume that the market declined by 25% during the
relevant period and at the same time the investor's account declined from $ 100,000 to $20,000.
If the court's formula is applied, the $80,000 loss is reduced by 25% to $60,000, which is
awarded to the plaintiff. The proper formula would reduce the $100,000 to $75,000 and award
plaintiff $55,000. The court's formula gives plaintiff a windfall of $5,000, which he would not
have had if he had not traded at all.
41. 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3383 (Dec. 5, 1978).
42. The district court found BEDCO liable on two grounds - respondeat superior and
as a controlling person under § 20 of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1970).
For purposes of the appeal, BEDCO conceded that if Stott was liable, it was vicariously liable
as a controlling person. 570 F.2d at 48.
43. See Sansweet, Broker Bribery. Investment Advirers' Fraud and Kickbacks Bring SEC
Crackdown, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1978, § 1, at 19, col. 3.
44. The definition of reckless should maintain a clear distinction between scienter and
negligence. The difference is one of kind, not merely degree. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,
554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).
[Casenote by John C. Rodneyl.

